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Security Interests in Thoroughbred
and Standardbred Horses:
A Transactional Approach
By R. DAviD LESTER*
INTRODUCTION
The growth of the sport and industry of racing and breeding
horses has created an increasing demand for the use of horses as
collateral. Securing debt with horses presents unusually chal-
lenging problems, primarily because of the difficulty in charac-
terizing the collateral within the molds provided by Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). Other prob-
lems are created because horses differ from other types of proper-
ty offered as security. Horses typically have different characteris-
tics during their lives. For example, a horse which is first used for
racing may later be used for breeding. The value and sex of the
animal will have a great impact on the horse's characterization as
collateral during the breeding stage; a valuable stallion is less
likely to be moved for breeding purposes than a mare. Whether
the animal is syndicated will play a role in its characterization as
collateral. Further, some horses engaged in racing frequently
move from state to state while others do not move at all. Special
considerations also will be required if the collateral is or may be
moved outside the United States.
Certain practices within the horse industry also affect the
perfection and protection of security interests in horses. Illustra-
tive is the fact that many races, particularly of thoroughbreds,
are claiming races' in which title to the collateral may change
hands in a somewhat involuntary fashion.
" Partner in the Lexington, Kentucky law firm of Stoll, Keenon & Park. B.S. 1970,
Western Kentucky University; J.D. 1975, University of Kentucky.
1 A claiming race is a particular type of race in which entries may be purchased by
eligible stable owners. The purchase price for the horse is specified prior to the race, and
any stable owner wishing to enter a "claim" for the horse at the specified price does so be-
fore the race. Thus, by entering a thoroughbred in a claiming race, the owner is, in effect,
offering the horse for sale.
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These difficulties in characterizing horses as collateral under
Article 9 of the Code will be the focus of this paper. We analyze
both the 1962 and 1972 official versions of the Code, as well as
the 1962 version as modified by the Kentucky General Assem-
bly.2 1 In addition, the impact of the rules and regulations of The
Jockey Club3 and the United States Trotting Association4 must
be, and will be, considered. Because a horse can become almost
valueless if it cannot be registered by these organizations, the im-
portance of their rules cannot be underestimated.
I. DOCUMENTATION
To perfect a security interest in a horse, it ordinarily is neces-
sary to enter into a security agreement and file one or more fi-
nancing statements.s Other documents which an informed
lender may require in connection with the making of a loan se-
cured by a horse include insurance documentation, an opinion of
counsel (or some other analysis) as to ownership and pre-existing
liens, delivery to the lender of the registration certificate issued
by The Jockey Club or The United States Trotting Association
and an assignment and power of attorney with respect to such
certificate. Each of these documents will be given individual
consideration below.
Other documents that a lender may find appropriate in some
circumstances include a letter or agreement from a syndicate
2 If a reference is made to a section of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
without stating which version is being considered, the reference will be to the 1962 version
of the text and accompanying comments. Any discussion of the 1972 version or Kentucky's
version will specifically state which version is being considered.
3 The Jockey Club acts as the official breed registry for thoroughbreds in the United
States and Canada. As such, The Jockey Club promulgates rules and regulations govern-
ing the breeding of thoroughbred horses.
4 The United States Trotting Association is comprised of persons in the business of
breeding, training and racing standardbred horses, officials of harness racing, track offi-
cers and other organizations which sponsor the racing of pacing and trotting horses. With
a purpose of improving the breed of pacing and trotting horses, the association establishes
rules regulating the standards and registration of such horses, among other functions.
5 A security agreement is defined as "an agreement which creates or provides for a
security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105 (1972). A financing statement is the document which
must be filed to perfect a security interest in certain types of collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-
302(1). For a discussion of these documents as they specifically relate to the use of horses as
collateral, see the text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
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manager regarding transferability to the debtor and ownership
(often called an "estoppel certificate") and letters regarding
proof of payment from the persons providing board and stallion
service for the horse.6
A. The Jockey Club Certificate and The United States Trotting
Association Registration Certificate
The Jockey Club and The United States Trotting Association
play a significant role in the registration of thoroughbred and
standardbred horses respectively. These associations issue certif-
icates needed to effectively sell, race or breed horses.
It is particularly difficult for a creditor to obtain the neces-
sary documents for racing horses. The Jockey Club certificates
must be held by the owner before any horse may be entered in
any thoroughbred race. 7 Similarly, therUnited States Trotting As-
sociation Registration certificate is required to enter standard-
bred races which are designated as claiming races." Many of the
thoroughbred races also are claiming races, a type of race which
presents special problems to a creditor holding a security interest
in a horse. 9 Horses entered in such races may be "claimed" by
third parties, resulting in title to the horse and the certificate be-
ing transferred to the claiming party. Thus, a creditor who ac-
cepts racing horses as security may take a chance that the horse
will be entered in a claiming race and be claimed.
If a horse subject to a security interest is claimed, or if the
creditor otherwise fails to obtain the certificate, it may be possi-
ble for a court to find the creditor's security interest was
waived.10 Because a failure to obtain the certificate might result
in a waiver, there is a possibility that the certificates might be
treated as property separate from the horse." The difficulty in
6 The importance of getting proof of payment from these persons relates to liens
which may arise in their favor under Kentucky law. A discussion of these liens and their
relation to security interests under Article 9 can be found in the text accompanying notes
131-51 infra.
7 THEJOCKEY CLuB RULE OF RACING 73 (1982).
8 Tim UNITED STATES TROTTING Ass5N Rule 10, § 9 (1982).
9 For a discussion of claiming races, see note 1 supra.
10 For a discussion of the possibility of such a waiver, see the text accompanying
notes 161-66 infra.
n See Lee v. Cox, 18 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 807, 809-10 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), discussed
in the text accompanying notes 14-21 in.fra.
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controlling collateral separate from the certificate suggests that
the well-advised lender will likely reject a loan which cannot be
made without reliance upon the horse as collateral. While it may
be possible to limit this risk to some extent when the value of the
horse is so great the horse would be unlikely to enter a claiming
race or when the debtor contractually agrees not to enter the
horse in a claiming race, the loan would still be risky since horses
often are traded or sold at tracks with many buyers believing the
certificate to be an adequate indication of the right to transfer.
In addition to these problems, both The Jockey Club and The
United States Trotting Association would likely be concerned
about a creditor trying to impose upon those who would claim at
tracks a duty to check for any financing statement filings. As dis-
cussed below, the cooperation of The Jockey Club and The
United States Trotting Association can be helpful to creditors.
Possession of the certificates has importance apart from
transfers at race tracks. Even though it is doubtful that a pur-
chaser could successfully argue that a certificate is an "instru-
ment" which must be perfected by possession, 1 the possession of
the certificate by a creditor may avoid problems. Even in the
case of sales away from the track, title to horses is frequently
transferred by merely endorsing and delivering the certificate.
This could be considered a trade custom, and it might be argued
that the lender has waived a continued claim to its security inter-
est by allowing the debtor to retain the certificate in light of such
a custom. 3
Moreover, in Lee v. Cox,14 a United States district court sur-
prisingly held that while the registration certificate of an
Arabian horse was not an instrument by which a security interest
in a horse must be perfected by possession, the registration certif-
icate may itself be property in which a security interest could be
perfected by possession or to which the legal title could be sold. If
the legal title to the certificate was sold as separate property, the
debtor in possession of the horses would have to sell them "at the
best price possible without the registration papers." 5
12 See id. at 810-11.
13 Waiver is discussed in the text accompanying notes 161-66 infra.
14 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 807.
I1 Id. at 811. The district court explained its reasoning as follows:
Although the registration papers could not give appellant [Cox] a right to the
1068 [Vol. 70
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In this particular case, Cox sold eight Arabian horses at an
auction to Lee and retained the registration papers as security for
the unpaid portion of the purchase price. Subsequently, Lee, as a
"debtor in possession" under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Code, filed a complaint to recover the papers. The bankruptcy
judge determined that no financing statement had been filed and
that the retention of the certificates did not create a security in-
terest pursuant to U.C.C. Article 9. The judge ordered Cox to
turn the registration certificates over to Lee and ordered Lee to
sell the horses so that the parties could subsequently litigate who
would be entitled to the proceeds.16 The District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee agreed that possession of the certif-
icates did not perfect a security interest in the horses.'7 However,
the district court decided that there was either an effective
pledge and perfection of a security interest in the papers (either
under Article 9 or by common law) or, even if there had not been
a pledge, the seller's rights under the contract of sale should
otherwise be enforced. 8
Although the case may reach an equitable result, Lee v. Cox
establishes a bad precedent without a clear analysis of the legal
horses, the question remains as to whether their possession gave the appel-
lants [sic] a security interest in the papers themselves .... It is quite nor-
mal to assume, as apparently the Bankruptcy Judge did, that these papers
have no value without the horses. It is, however, indisputable that the horses
will sell at a much higher price with the certificates than without; therefore,
an industrious holder could presumably seek to arrange their
sale .... Given the conclusion that appellant successfully perfected a se-
curity interest in the papers themselves, and the fact that the debt was not
paid in full as the contract required, the Bankruptcy Judge had no authority
to require that the papers be turned over to the debtor's estate ....
Id. at 810-11.
16 Id. at 807-08.
17 Id. at 810.
18 Id. The court stated:
Even if the retention of the registration papers cannot be said to consti-
tute an Article 9 or common law pledge, the appellants right to those papers
can still be sustained under the contract for sale on which there is apparently
no disagreement. The contract provided that Cox would keep the papers un-
til such time as he was paid in full. At most, Lee had only an equitable inter-
est in the papers while Cox retained legal title. When the debt was not extin-
guished, the equities in favor of Lee should have dissolved, leaving Cox the
right to the papers.
Id. at 811.
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principles involved. The close relationship among the horse and
certificate and the fact that the certificate is valueless without the
horse indicates they should be treated as one item of property.
Unfortunately, a lender who files a financing statement and
otherwise properly perfects a security interest in a horse may be
surprised to find that it may not be able to sell the horse as a reg-
istered horse. Even the district court conceded that "this sort of
arrangement does not fit squarely within any of the categories of
§ 9-305."19 The district court's reliance upon some sort of com-
mon law lien is clearly erroneous since Article 9 governs all con-
sensual security interests and abrogates common law pledges. °
Certainly, the district court's suggestion that the seller has re-
tained legal title and thus may not be subject to the perfection
provisions of Article 9 ignores the provisions of U.C.C. section 9-
102(2) which clearly indicate that a seller's retention of title is
within the scope of Article 9.21 In any event, at least until other
courts have analyzed this issue, lenders will want to make sure
they perfect in both the horse and certificate.
In addition to the possible practice of the trade and other
problems which can arise if a lender allows a debtor to retain
possession of the certificate, The United States Trotting Associa-
tion normally requires the certificate to be returned at the time of
transfer.21 The Jockey Club presently requires its certificate to be
returned for breeding stock which is listed in the Ownership Reg-
istryA. 3 If not listed, the animal would need to be listed and
blood-typed after a change in ownership.2 In any event, it may
be more burdensome to sell the horse without the certificate.
In connection with receipt of the certificate, it is wise for a
lender to obtain a written assignment of the certificate and a
power of attorney. Of course, this document can be most impor-
19 Id.
2o See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) and 9-102 comment 1.
21 U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1972) provides: "This Article applies to security interests
created by ... title retention contract .... Other provisions to the same effect include
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1) and 9-107. See generally J. WHITE & R. SuM~MRs, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-2 (2d ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
2 THE UNITED STATES TROTTING ASS'N Rule 26, § 15 (1982).
2 THE JOCKEY CLUB REGISTRATION Rule 7 (1982).24 Id. at Rule 5.
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tant in transferring title if a default sale under U.C.C. section 9-
504 is necessary.25
A lender normally should notify The Jockey Club or The
United States Trotting Association of its security interest in a
horse. Perhaps the most significant reason for such notification is
that it is possible to obtain a duplicate registration certificate for
a horse in which a second party has a security interest. Thus, the
notification, together with the creditor's possession of the certif-
icate, may make it difficult for the owner to transfer ownership
of the horse without the lender's consent.
B. Security Agreement and Financing Statements
In addition to The Jockey Club certificate and the United
States Trotting Association certificate, a creditor also should ob-
tain a security agreement and financing statement. Assuming the
lender adopts the policy of not making loans secured by horses
engaged in racing, a standard "form" security agreement would
normally be adequate for non-racing horses, although the lender
may want to add provisions regarding: (1) whether the horses
are "movables" within the meaning of U. C. C. section 9-103;2 1(2)
what, if any, representations have been made regarding the loca-
tion, residence and principal place of business of the owners;- (3)
who would have possession of certificates of offspring if products
are included in the security agreement, and (4) a power of attor-
ney to transfer and an assignment with respect to The Jockey
Club or The United States Trotting Association Registration cer-
tificate if a separate form is not used. Further, if the debtor in-
tends to sell breeding rights to the horse or to sell its offspring,
special provisions for the partial release of the security interest
may be necessary. Special documentation should always be used
in the cases of racing horses and syndicate shares because both of
these types of collateral normally require special considerations.28
25 U.C.C. § 9-504 sets out the procedures to be followed when a secured lender re-
possesses and resells collateral upon a default by the debtor.
26 For a discussion of U.C.C. § 9-103(2), see text accompanying notes 81-93 infra.
27 These considerations are important in determining where to file within a partic-
ular state. See text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
28 Considerations as to racing horses are discussed in the text accompanying notes 7-
11 supra, while those concerning syndicated horses are discussed in the text accompanying
notes 37-46 infra.
1981-82] 1071
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL
In preparing the security agreement and financing state-
ment, special attention should be given to describing the collat-
eral. Section 9-110 of the Code states: "For the purposes of this
Article any description of personal property or real estate is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is
described."29 A normal description of a horse will include breed,
sex, coloration, breeding, year foaled, registered name and cer-
tificate number. However, a much less detailed description such
as "all horses or livestock and progeny thereof now owned or
hereafter acquired" apparently will be sufficient.30 One also may
want to state a security interest is being taken in the certificate in
addition to the horse.31
Special care should be used if a location of the collateral will
be employed in the description because of the possibility that the
animals will not be where the secured party believes them to be
located. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled that parol evidence is inadmissible to show that equipment
intended to be covered was at a different location from that
designated in the security agreement and financing statement.32
The court rationalized its hardline stand against using parol evi-
dence to determine what collateral was covered by the security
agreement by stating that the admission of parol evidence
"would prove detrimental not only to the goals of Section 9-203
but also to the fundamental goal" of Article 9 to simplify financ-
ing transactions. 3 While the movement of the collateral subse-
quent to the perfection of the security interest may not invalidate
the lien,34 the inclusion of a location is not required and may
29 U.C.C. § 9-110.
30 See United States v. Southeast Miss. Livestock Farmers Ass'n, 619 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Pirnie, 339 F. Supp. 702 (D. Neb. 1972), affd, 472 F.2d 712
(8th Cir. 1973); In re Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd., 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 193
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1976). But see Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429
S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968) (description "all farm equipment" construed as too vague to be
given effect in a security agreement).
31 See text accompanying notes 7-25 supra for a discussion of why this action may be
advisable.
32 In re California Pump & Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 717,719-20 (9th Cir. 1978).
33 Id. at 720.
34 See, e.g., In re Page, 16 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 501, 506-07 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1974)
(inventory and equipment properly described in chattle mortgage and financing statement
are subject to security interest notwithstanding the collateral being moved from the loca-
tion designated in the financing statement). See generally U.C.C. § 9-401(3).
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create unnecessary problems, and thus should be avoided .5
In the case of a syndicate share, the collateral should be care-
fully described to show that the collateral consists of the debtor's
undivided interest in the horse as well as all other rights the
debtor may have under the syndicate agreement. Exercising such
care is important because ofthe particular difficulty in classify-
ing the collateral and the possibility that there are really two
types of collateral involved in such a situation.5
C. Special Documents for Syndicate Shares
A special security agreement should be used for syndicate
shares. The rights of the debtor are particularly difficult to char-
acterize and several unusual problems may surface if there is a
need for enforcement.37
In addition, substantial consideration must be given to the
syndicate agreement, particularly as to any prohibitions against
transfer. Almost all syndicate agreements contain some type of
express prohibition against assignment. The issue is whether the
particular provision will affect the creation of a security interest
which is, of course, a type of limited assignment.
Section 9-318(4) of the 1962 version of the Code provides: "A
term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor
which prohibits assignment of an account or contract right to
which they are parties is ineffective." The 1972 version of the
Code expands "account or contract rights" to include "general
intangible." 39 In either version, the potential problem relative to
the characterization of a syndicate share as collateral 4° is whether
3 See, e.g., In re Little Brick Shirthouse, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. IlM. 1972)
(argument rejected that collateral subject to security interest should be limited to only the
collateral located at the debtor's principal address, stated in the financial statement); First
State Bank of Nora Springs v. Waychus, 183 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1971) (financing state-
ment's erroneous description of the location of collateral held insufficient to invalidate the
financing statement).
36 For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in dealing with syndicate shares as col-
lateral, see text accompanying notes 62-74 infra.
37 See text accompanying notes 62-74 infra.
38 U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
3 For a discussion of why these changes were made, see U.C.C. § 9-318 Reasons for
1972 Change (1972).
" The problems in characterizing syndicate shares as collateral are more fully
handled in the text accompanying notes 62-74 infra.
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the syndicate share should be characterized as goods or as an ac-
count, contract right or other intangible. If the syndicate share is
goods, section 9-318(4) will not apply.41
If section 9-318(4) of the Code does not apply, we must look
to the common law.42 In the early part of this century, courts
were likely to hold an anti-assignment provision effective as to an
assignee with knowledge; however, this rule has been substan-
tially undermined. 4 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts provides that, "unless a different intention is manifested,"
a contract term prohibiting assignment is for the benefit of the
obligor and does not "prevent the assignee from acquiring rights
against the assignor." 44 In fact, some courts have held assign-
ments effective, simply ignoring anti-assignment provisions. 4 In
addition, some courts have held that prohibitions against assign-
ment do not affect assignments for security unless the agreement
specifically prohibits assignments for security. 46
Whatever risk that exists in this regard can be reduced by ob-
taining an estoppel certificate or similar document from the syn-
dicate manager. That is, a lender may find it advisable to have
the syndicate manager provide documentation of the following:
(1) a certified copy of the syndicate agreement;
(2) the identity of the present owner of the share as
shown on the syndicate manager's records;
(3) whether the transfer of the share to the debtor and
41 The application of U.C.C. § 9-318(4) is limited to terms which prohibit the as-
signment of an account or the creation of a security interest in a general intangible for
money due or to become due, and to terms which require an account debtor's consent to
such assignment or security interest. U.C.C. § 9-318(4) (1972).
42 See U.C.C. § 1-103.
43 See, e.g., Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7 (1916). See also
U.C.C. § 9-318 comment 4; 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNrrACTs §
422 (3d ed. 1960). But see, e.g., Harris v. Clinton, 112 A.2d 885 (Conn. 1955) (demand
for specific performance of bilateral contract by assignees denied because contract, involv-
ing provisions personal in nature, could only be*performed by the assignor); National
Lumber Co. v. Goodman, 123 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. 1963) (same).
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 322(2) (1981).
45 See generally 4 A. CORBIN, COR IN ON CONTRACTS § 873 (1951) and cases cited
therein. Of course, these cases must be carefully analyzed with consideration given to the
subject matter of the applicable contracts and the status of the parties' performance.4 6 E.g., Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., Inc., 452 F.2d 1346
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Inter-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 84 So. 625 (Miss. 1919);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Smith, 78 So. 289 (Miss. 1918).
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all previous transfers complied with the requirements of
the syndicate agreement;
(4) whether the syndicate agreement or any other
agreement known to the syndicate manager would pro-
hibit the creation of the security interest;
(5) the balance, if any, due with respect to the pur-
chase of the share;
(6) any other liens on the share known by the syndi-
cate manager, and
(7) whether the syndicate manager will note the se-
cured party's lien on its records and notify the secured
party of any attempt to transfer the share.
D. Opinions of Counsel
A lender may require an opinion of counsel reflecting the
examination of records in the appropriate locations. This is com-
plicated by frequent changes in ownership, the difficulty in de-
termining where financing statements should be filed 47 and the
possibility that some states may have special legislation in this
area of the law.4 Of course, the value of such an examination is
inherently limited because no state requires the registration of
title to thoroughbred or standardbred horses. 49
E. Insurance Documentation
Most lenders will want to obtain other normal documen-
tation for a loan with a horse as collateral. This would normally
include the assignment of appropriate insurance coverage.
Several types of insurance coverage are available with respect to
horses. Mortality insurance will probably be required by most se-
cured parties. The lender should exercise caution when dealing
with a syndicated horse because in some instances mortality in-
47 For a discussion of the determination of where to file a financing statement, see
text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
48 See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 355.9-307(4) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
49 The value of states having such a registration requirement can be seen by consid-
ering the benefits which the prevalent certificate of title requirements for automobiles pro-
vide. Compare U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1962) with U.C.C. § 9-103(2) (1972).
1981-82] 1075
1076 KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL [Vol. 70
surance is purchased by each shareholder and in others by the
syndicate manager. Other insurance which may be available in-
cludes fertility insurance (which provides protection from a re-
duction in the value of a stallion if he proves infertile) and in
utero insurance (which can protect against the loss of a foal while
in the uterus).
II. PERFECTION OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
A. Filing
After the necessary documents have been obtained, the cred-
itor must determine how the security interest should be per-
fected. There are several different methods in which to perfect a
security interest, with the appropriate method for a particular
transaction depending largely upon how the collateral is charac-
terized. The desires of the parties also may affect the appropriate
method of perfection.
The general rule under the 1972 version of the Code is that a
financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest;
however, section 9-302(1) provides several exceptions to the gen-
eral filing requirement.", The 1962 version of the Code includes a
provision, not in the 1972 version, which excludes from the filing
So In part, U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1972) provides:
A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests ex-
cept the following:
a) a security interest in collateral in possession of the secured party un-
der Section 9-305;
b) a security interest temporarily perfected in instruments or docu-
ments without delivery under Section 9-304 or in proceeds for a ten day
period under Section 9-306;
c) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in
a trust or a decedent's estate;
d) a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is
required for a motor vehicle required to be registered; and fixture filing is re-
quired for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided
in Section 9-313;
e) an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction
with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the
outstanding accounts or contract rights of the assignor;
g) an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor,
and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder.
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requirement a security interest in farm equipment having a pur-
chase price not in excess of $2,500.51 Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) section 355.9-302(1) adopts the 1962 provision, except it
changes the $2,500 limit to $500.52
In analyzing whether a financing statement must be filed, it
will be assumed that possession of the animal pursuant to section
9-305 is not a practical solution, either because the debtor will
normally require possession or because most creditors are not
prepared to perfect by possession. Of course, in some instances
possession by an agent may be appropriate.m It also will be as-
sumed that neither The Jockey Club nor The United States Trot-
ting Association certificates are "instruments" which must be
perfected by possession. 5
A detailed discussion of perfection by possession is not appro-
priate here because it applies to other types of collateral as well
and thus exceeds the scope of this Article. However, one should
keep that possibility in mind, particularly with the use of an
agent, for an unusual case where there is no suitable alternative.
Possession may be particularly useful in the case of a retained se-
curity interest in connection with the syndication of a stallion.55
Moreover, sections 9-302(1)(a) and (b) have importance to a
lender beyond providing a method of perfection because of the
possibility that the person in possession of the horses may have
priority over the lender.0 Thus, if one other than the debtor is in
possession of the horse, the lender should consider demanding a
letter from the party in possession disclaiming any security inter-
est in the horse, either on the possessor's behalf or as an agent for
another person.
51 The 1972 version eliminated the exception for farm equipment to enhance the
ability of farmers to use their equipment as collateral. U.C.C. § 9-302 Reason for 1972
Change (1972).
52 KRS § 355.9-302(1)(c) (1972).
' See U.C.C. § 9-305 comment 2; WHITE & SUMMERS § 23-10, supra note 21. Cer-
tainly, though, neither the debtor nor a person the debtor controls can be the secured
party's agent for purposes of perfection by possession. U.C.C. § 9-305 comment 2.
54 See U.C.C. § 9-304(1). See text accompanying notes 12-21 supra for a discussion
of the role of registration certificates in the context of Article 9.
5' See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(a), which excludes from the filing requirement a security
interest in collateral in possession of the secured party under U.C.C. § 9-305.
M See U.C.C. H8 9-302, 9-312.
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If horses can be treated as "farm equipment," section 9-
302(1)(c) of the 1962 version of the Code may be significant; a fi-
nancing statement need not be filed if the horse's value is less
than $2,500.57 However, the 1972 version deleted the exception
for farm equipment.0 It is this author's belief, however, that it is
inappropriate to classify horses as "farm equipment" even
though they might be classified as "equipment" in some in-
stances. 59
While it may be possible for horses to be used as "consumer
goods" and therefore not require filing,® this Article will not deal
with this problem because few loans will be secured by that type
of horse. Further, the argument that a horse may fail at stud and
be converted to another use is likely to have little consequence,
not only because of the amount of money involved but also be-
cause section 9-302(1)(d) is limited to purchase money security
interests. 61
A more substantial problem exists with section 9-302(1)(e)
because of the possibility that a syndicate share may be charac-
terized, at least in part, as an account or contract right. An unre-
corded assignment by the debtor might exist at the time the
lender perfects its security interest. If so, and if that together
with other assignments to the same transferee does not constitute
a significant part of the transferor's accounts or contract rights,
the pre-existing assignee could have priority under section 9-312
if the syndicate share is characterized as a contract right or ac-
count. Several questions have arisen in interpreting section 9-
302(1) (e), such as how much is a "significant part"62 and whether
the Code applies to an unconditional assignment of accounts.3
The most difficult issue in this regard, though, is whether the
syndicate share is an account, contract right, a good or even
57 U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c). Note, however, under Kentucky's version, filing is required
for farm equipment valued above $500.
8 The reason for this deletion is discussed in note 51 supra.
59 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(2)-(3). For a further discussion of this point, see text ac-
companying notes 101-108 infra.
60 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
61 Id.
62 See WHITE & SUMMERS § 23-8, at 926, supra note 21.
63 See, e.g., Spurlin v. Sloan, 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1953). See also WrITE & SUM-
MERS § 23-8.
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something else. Of course, the importance of this issue goes be-
yond the question of the necessity to perfect by filing, for it also is
relevant in determining which state's laws apply and where to
file within a particular state. 4 This analysis cannot be made ad-
equately without first analyzing the terms of the particular syn-
dicate agreement.
Most syndicate agreements purport to convey an undivided
interest in the horse to each shareholder and to delineate the
shareholder's access and other rights with respect to the horse.
Based upon this, it seems that the collateral is an interest in the
horse and, thus, goods. 6s However, syndicate agreements often
provide for pools, receipts for outside breedings and other mat-
ters. Thus, the collateral could be characterized partially as
goods and partially as an intangible. It may, of course, be argued
that the collateral is purely an intangible since the rights of the
shareholder are merely those outlined in the agreement.
Perhaps the most helpful case in dealing with this question is
Harry F. Guggenheim, 1 a Tax Court case. In 1958, Guggenheim
syndicated the thoroughbred stallion, *Turn-To. 7 The stallion
was divided into thirty-five shares, fifteen of which were re-
tained by Guggenheim. The syndicate agreement was typical of
many syndicate agreements now in use. The Internal Revenue
Service argued that the sale of the shares was actually the sale of
breeding rights (thus not I.R.C. section 1231 property) and that
the gain should be taxed as ordinary income. 6 However, the Tax
Court agreed with the taxpayer that the sale was of undivided in-
terests in the horse, a capital asset, and the gain was taxable as a
long-term capital gainA9 While the issue before the Tax Court
was not exactly the same as the Article 9 question, the same
reasoning applies. The Tax Court noted that the syndicate agree-
ment stated that the rights being conveyed were undivided inter-
' For a discussion of the importance of properly characterizing collateral, see
U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 1.
65 For a discussion of characterizing the horse as goods under U.C.C. § 9-109, see
text accompanying notes 101-108 infra.
6 46 T.C. 559 (1966).
67 An asterisk appearing in front of a horse's name indicates that the horse was bred
outside the United States.
6' 46 T.C. at 566.
69 Id. at 568.
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ests in the horse and explained:
The parties agree that something was sold by reason of the
syndication of *Turn-To but do not agree on what was sold.
The syndication agreement purports to pass undivided owner-
ship interests, and while the form and language of the agree-
ment are not conclusive as to the true character of the transac-
tion, they are of some relevance. See Comtel Corp., 45 T.C.
294 (1965). Moreover, the actions of the parties were consistent
with the sale of undivided ownership interests. Petitioner, on
his records, stopped taking depreciation on the entire horse
and began taking depreciation on only a four-sevenths interest.
Some of the shareholders, if not all, capitalized their interests
in the horse after the purchase of the shares and depreciated
those interests. Petitioner, after the syndication, insured only
his interest in the horse. Some of the shareholders, if not all, in-
sured their interests in the horse after the purchase of the
shares.
The differences between ownership of property having a
limited life and the right to the full enjoyment and use of that
property for its life are not appreciable. It can be argued that
there are no significant economic differences.
We agree with respondent that, due to the arrangement of
the syndicate, the rights and obligations of a shareholder may
have no substantial economic value above and beyond the
rights and obligations of a lifetime season holder. However,
they are substantive indicia of ownership, and, when com-
bined with the form of the transaction, lead us to believe that
the property interests transferred by the syndication agreement
should be considered undivided ownership interests in *Turn-
To.70
This writer likewise believes it is appropriate to characterize
a typical syndicate share as goods even though there are argu-
ments it should be treated as a contract right, general intangible,
instrument or a combination of these. The position of the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission in recent no-action letters that at
least certain syndicate shares are not securities also may support
this argument.71
70 Id. at 566-68 (footnotes omitted).
71 See, e.g., John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18, 1977). See
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Of course, any sums due a syndicate member from the syndi-
cate manager can appropriately be characterized as an "ac-
count." To the extent a syndicate agreement or other collateral
may be characterized as an intangible, we must turn to section 9-
106 to determine whether the collateral is an "account," a "con-
tract right" or a "general intangible." Section 9-106 states:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an in-
strument or chattel paper. "Contract right" means any right to
payment under a contract not yet earned by performance and
not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. "General in-
tangibles" means any personal property (including things in
action) other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel
paper, documents and instruments. 72
The 1972 version of the Code deleted the use of the term "con-
tract rights." 73 Such deletion may aid an argument that the col-
lateral is a "general intangible" rather than a "contract right."
However, that change apparently was not intended to make a
substantive distinction. 74
A detailed analysis of these definitions must be made in the
context of the particular syndicate agreement. In doing so, it
should be kept in mind that while all syndicate agreements dif-
fer, thoroughbred syndicate agreements normally differ consid-
erably from standardbred syndicate agreements. Also, a syndi-
cate manager may hold funds for a substantial time before mak-
ing a distribution to shareholders. Of course, to the extent the
syndicate manager actually holds funds already due and pay-
also Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. No. 3 (1981-82) (in print) for
an extensive discussion of syndication and securities as they relate to stallions.
72 U.C.C. § 9-106.
73 U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972).
74 See U.C.C. § 9-106 Reason for 1972 Change (1972) which explains:
The term "contract right" has been eliminated as unnecessary. As indicated
by a sentence now being eliminated from Section 9-306(1), "contract right"
was thought of as an "account" before the right to payment became uncon-
ditional by performance by the creditor. But the distinction between "ac-
count" and "contract right" was not used in the Article except in subsection
(2) to Section 9-318 on the right of original parties to modify an assigned
contract, and that subsection has been redrafted to preserve the distinction
without needing the term "contract right."
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able, it seems the collateral should be treated as an account.
In summary, a secured party will likely determine that a se-
curity interest in a horse should be perfected by filing, at least as
a precautionary matter. The lender also should take steps to as-
sure that it will not be unexpectedly second in priority to a secur-
ity interest perfected by possession or one which is automatically
perfected. 75
B. Choice of Law
Once a lender determines it should perfect by filing, the next
step is to analyze where to file. This analysis also is relevant to the
need to file again when the collateral is moved. These consid-
erations are important with respect to horses because of the fre-
quency with which they can be and are moved. The appropriate
place to begin this analysis is with sections 9-10276 and 9-10377 of
75 As to those few instances in which automatic perfection may occur, see U.C.C. §
9-302(1).
76 U.C.C. § 9-102 provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state
transactions and in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article ap-
plies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within the juris-
diction of this state
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel
paper, accounts or contract rights; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract includ-
ing pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title reten-
tion contract and lease or consignment intended as security. This Article
does not apply to statutory liens except as provided in Section 9-310.
(3) The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured ob-
ligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a
transaction or interest to which this Article does not apply.
Id.
77 U.C.C. § 9-103 provides:
(1) If the office where the assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps
his record concerning them is in this state, the validity and perfection of a se-
curity interest therein and the possibility and effect of proper filing is gov-
erned by this Article; otherwise by the law (including the conflict of laws
rule) of the jurisdiction where such office is located.
(2) If the chief place of business of a debtor is in this state, this Article
governs the validity and perfection of a security interest and the possibility
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the Code which deal with the choice of law issue, including the
state in which perfection of the security interest must take place.
The Kentucky versions of these sections follow the 1962 offi-
and effect of proper filing with regard to general intangibles or with regard
to goods of a type which are normally used in more than one jurisdiction
(such as automotive equipment, rolling stock, airplanes, road building
equipment, commercial harvesting equipment, construction machinery and
the like) if such goods are classified as equipment or classified as inventory
by reason of their being leased by the debtor to others. Otherwise, the law
(including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where such chief
place of business is located shall govern. If the chief place of business is lo-
cated in a jurisdiction which does not provide for perfection of the security
interest by filing or recording in that jurisdiction, then the security interest
may be perfected by filing in this state ....
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections (1)
and (2) is already subject to a security interest when it is brought into this
state, the validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined by
the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the
property was when the security interest attached. However, if the parties to
the transaction understood at the time that the security interest attached
that the property would be kept in this state and it was brought into this
state within 30 days after the security interest attached for purposes other
than transportation through this state, then the validity of the security inter-
est in this state is to be determined by the law of this state. If the security in-
terest was already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the
property was when the security interest attached and before being brought
into this state, the security interest continues perfected in this state for four
months and also thereafter if within the four month period it is perfected in
this state. The security interest may also be perfected in this state after expi-
ration of the four month period; in such case perfection dates from the time
of perfection in this state. If the security interest was not perfected under the
law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest at-
tached and before being brought into this state, it may be perfected in this
state; in such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state.
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any se-
curity interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the perfec-
tion is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1) and Section 9-302, if the office
where the assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps his records concern-
ing them is not located in a jurisdiction which is a part of the United States,
its territories or possessions, and the accounts or contract rights are within
the jurisdiction of this state or the transaction which creates the security in-
terest otherwise bears an appropriate relation to this state, this Article gov-
erns the validity and perfection of the security interest and the security inter-
est may only be perfected by notification to the account debtor.
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cial version with no substantial variations. 7 While the 1972
changes in the Code included a complete rewriting of section 9-
103, the focus of those changes was primarily to cause this section
to deal solely with perfection and not with the validity of security
interests. 79 Other changes were more substantial, including
changing the location for filing with respect to intangibles.A0
However, our analysis focuses on classification of collateral and is
relative to either version. Of course, if the laws of a state which
has adopted the 1972 version of the Code govern the transaction,
special attention must be given to the appropriate statute.
The first determination with respect to a horse is whether it is
a movable good, that is, whether it is "goods of a type which are
normally used in more than one jurisdiction" and is "classified as
equipment or classified as inventory by reason of their being
leased by the debtor to others." 81 An analysis should start with a
determination of whether the horse can be classified as equip-
ment or inventory because of a lease by the debtor. While a horse
will most frequently be considered a "farm product" and, thus,
not "equipment" or "inventory," it sometimes may be appropri-
ate to classify a horse as "equipment" or "inventory."82
Where a horse is classifed as "equipment or "inventory"
leased by the debtor, an analysis of section 9-103(2) must con-
tinue.' If so, the fact that section 9-103 focuses on the "type" of
goods involved rather than the characteristics of the particular
item creates a problem. A'For example, a stallion may be a great
race horse and travel all over the country or world for a few years
and then retire to Kentucky to stud. Or, the horse may be a mare
which never leaves Kentucky or one which is moved around the
country to be bred to different stallions. The question, then,
should be whether the type of collateral is a "thoroughbred or
standardbred race horse" (which normally travels), a "thorough-
78 See KRS § 355.9-102 (1972); KRS § 355.9-103 (1972).
79 See U.C.C. § 9-103 Reason for 1972 Change (1972).
80 See U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1972); U.C.C. § 9-103 Reason for 1972 Change (1972).
81 U.C.C. § 9-103(2).
82 See U.C.C. § 9-109. For a more in-depth discussion of this point, see text accom-
panying notes 101-08 infra.
83 U.C.C. § 9-103(2).
84 See, e.g., In re Dennis Mitchell Industries, Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1969).
See also U.C.C. § 9-103 comment 5.
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bred or standardbred stallion standing at stud" (which normally
does not travel), or a "thoroughbred or standardbred brood-
mare" (which may or may not travel from state to state). Argu-
ably, this analysis is not broad enough and the "type" of collat-
eral is merely a "thoroughbred or standardbred horse" or even a
"horse" (both being types which may or may not normally be
used in more than one jurisdiction).
On the other hand, it may be arguable that such an analysis
is overly broad; for example, whether the mare is of a type which
normally would be bred and boarded in only one state or travel
to all states seeking the best stallions should be analyzed. This
problem is further complicated because a stallion may travel fre-
quently until it is retired to stud. The issue then is whether the
"type" of collateral changes at that point and, if so, whether a
new filing must be made. For instance, Comment 2 to section 9-
109 of the 1972 Code recognizes goods may fall into different cat-
egories in the hands of different owners.8
The most troublesome problem in this whole area is classifi-
cation of the collateral, and no cases appear to provide an an-
swer. Of course, the safest approach would be to properly per-
fect, first, in the state of the "chief place of business"' 6 of the
debtor (or the state in which "the debtor is located' 8 where the
1972 version applies) if the collateral could be considered a type
normally used in more than one jurisdiction and otherwise sub-
ject to section 9-103(3)m and, second, in the state where the col-
lateral is kept in accordance with sections 9-10289 and 9-103(3).90
If the horse is actually moved, additional filings may be re-
quired.
81 U.C.C. 9-109 comment 2 (1972) states:
The classes of goods are mutually exclusive; the same property cannot
at the same time and as to the same person be both equipment and inven-
tory, for example. In borderline cases-a physician's car or a farmer's jeep
which might be either consumer goods or equipment-the principal use to
which the property is put should be considered as determinative. Goods can
fall into different classes at different times; a radio is inventory in the hands
of a dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a householder.
8' U.C.C. § 9-103(2).
87 U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (1972).
88 U.C.C. § 9-103(3).
89 Id. § 9-102.
90 Id. § 9-103(3).
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The analysis of the applicable law is further complicated
where the security is a person's interest in a syndicated horse. As
discussed above, the interest in the syndicate can conceivably be
treated as "contract rights." If so, the law of the state where the
assignor keeps records concerning the contract rights governs 91
(or where "the debtor is located"92 if the state has adopted the
1972 version of the Code). Similarly, if a syndicate share is char-
acterized as a "general intangible," the provisions of section 9-
103(2)93 will govern the choice of law issue.
Because of the inherent difficulty in classifying horses as col-
lateral, several filings may be in order, particularly for a interest
in a syndicated horse. Multiple filings in states where an attorney
is not familiar with recording requirements may cause further
problems. Some states have recordation taxes and unusual ver-
sions of section 9-402 regarding the requirements for financing
statements, such as technical requirements involving type, mar-
gin and paper size.94 Financing statements may be returned,
leading to substantial delay and risk. The expense and burden of
multiple filings in other states certainly require the lender's attor-
ney to be aware of the appropriate filing requirements before
preparing and executing the documents.
C. Where to File
After a creditor decides it should file a financing statement,
and a determination has been made as to the applicable state
law, it is necessary to look to section 9-401(1) of the Code to de-
termine where to file in the appropriate state or states.5 There
91 Id. § 9-103(1).
92 U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (1972).
93 U.C.C. § 9-103(2). See note 77 supra for the full text of § 9-103.
4 A good source revealing various state variations in Code sections, especially § 9-
401, is UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE, STATE CORRELATION TABLES
(1979).
" A secured party may wish to file financing statements in more than one state if the
collateral and/or the secured party has contacts with multiple states and the answer as to
where to file is not clear-cut; it is better to file in too many places than to guess at the
proper place to file and later find out that your interpretation of the U.C.C. was incor-
rect. Further, if the states have different versions of the Code, it may be essential to file in
both states in order to be perfected in both states.
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are various alternatives of section 9-401(1) and it is important to
review the appropriate version of each state carefully.m In fact,
96 The three alternatives of U.C.C. § 9-401(1) are:
First Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security in-
terest attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office
where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or
recorded;
(b) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
Second Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations,
or farm products, or accounts, contract rights or general intangi-
bles arising from or relating to the sale of farm products by a
farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the ...... in
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a res-
ident of this state then in the office of the ...... in the county
where the goods are kept, and in addition when the collateral is
crops in the office of the ...... in the county where the land on
which the crops are growing or to be grown is located;
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security
interest attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office
where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or
recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State].
Third Alternative Subsection (1)
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is equipment used in farming operations,
or farm products, or accounts, contract rights or general intangi-
bles arising from or relating to the sale of farm products by a
farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the ...... in
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a res-
ident of this state then in the office of the ...... in the county
were the goods are kept,. and in addition when the collateral is
crops in the office of the ...... in the county where the land on
which the crops are growing or to be grown is located;
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security in-
terest attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office
where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or
recorded;
(c) in all other cases, in the office of the [Secretary of State] and in
addition, if the debtor has a place of business in only one county of
this state, also in the office of ...... of such county, or, if the
debtor has no place of business in this state, but resides in the
state, also in the office of ...... of the county in which he re-
sides.
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this is the section of the Code which probably has the greatest
variance among states. 97
Before determining where to file, it again is necessary to
characterize the collateral. Depending on the version of the Code
and the applicable alternative, a determination must be made as
to whether the collateral is: (1) "equipment used in farming op-
erations, or farm products, or accounts, contract rights or gen-
eral intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of farm pro-
ducts by a farmer, or consumer goods (1962 version);"1' (2)
"equipment used in farming operations, or farm products, or ac-
counts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale
of farm products by a farmer, or consumer goods (1972 ver-
sion),"' or (3) anything else. There is no difference between the
first two categories described above in that property considered a
"contract right" in the 1962 version of the Code was included in
the definition of "account" in the 1972 version. 100
The beginning point in characterizing horses as collateral is
U.C.C. section 9-109, which divides "goods" into four subcat-
egories: "consumer goods," "equipment," "farm products" and
"inventory."10' These categories are intended to be mutually ex-
97 Of the 49 states which have adopted the U.C.C., five (Kentucky, Maryland, Ne-
braska, Oregon and Wyoming) have their own version of U.C.C. § 9-401(1). Of the re-
maining 44 states, seven have adopted alternative (1); 24 have adopted alternative (2), and
13 have adopted alternative (3). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE,
STATE CORRELATION TABLEs (1979).
98 U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (a) (Alternatives 2 and 3).
'9 U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (a) (1972) (Alternatives 2 and 3).
100 This view is explicitly set forth in U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972) Reasons for 1972
Change.
Io; U.C.C. § 9-109 provides:
Goods are
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for use primarily for person-
al, family or household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (in-
cluding farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organiza-
tion or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included
in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or pro-
duced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in
their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup,
milk or eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising,
fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products
they are neither equipment nor inventory;
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elusive. 0 2 The principal test is the use of the collateral, and
where there is more than one use the principal use should be de-
terminative. 10 Further, the same goods may fall into a different
category when they are in the hands of a different owner. 14
While horses offered as security will frequently be considered
livestock and thus "farm products" (and therefore not equipment
or inventory), a problem occurs if the debtor is not engaged in
farming operations. The intent of the drafters of the Code was to
have livestock lose its status as "farm products" when no longer
used in connection with a farming operation (e.g., racing-un-
less one could adequately connect the racing to farming), even
though the person who is racing the horse may be engaged in
farming operations. 0" Also, a horse would apparently lose its sta-
tus as a "farm product" if it came into the possession of one not
engaged in farming operations (e.g., a person who would race
it). 10 Another problem may exist where the debtor leases a horse.
Can it be said the horse is not a "farm product" because the
debtor is no longer engaged in a farming operation? However, if
the horse is not classified as a "farm product" because it is not in
the possession of a debtor engaged in farming, it would seem that
it should not be classified as "farm equipment" for the same
reason. If the horse cannot be classified as "farm equipment" for
this reason, it must be classified as either "equipment" (other
than "farm equipment"), "consumer goods" or "inventory."
Once the appropriate categorizations have been made, it is a
relatively simple matter to look to section 9-401 and see where to
file. However, it is often difficult to categorize horses, particular-
ly syndicate interests, in the required manner. Depending upon
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease
or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them,
or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed
in a business. Inventory of a person is not to be classified as his equipment.
Id. The 1972 version is identical. See U.C.C. § 9-109 (1972). The Kentucky version differs
only in subsection (3), in which the category labeled "farm products" does not include
"supplies." See KRS § 355.9-109(3) (1972). However, this variation is of no consequence
for purposes of this Article.
102 U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 2, set out in note 85supra.
103 Id.104 Id.
105 See id. at comment 4.
106 See id.
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the circumstances, horses may be characterized in various ways.
Section 9-109 indicates that a horse may be "inventory," "equip-
ment" or even "consumer goods" if it is not a "farm product."
Thus, the appropriate analysis is to first determine if the horse is
a "farm product," "inventory" or "equipment."
This analysis must be made on a case by case basis and some
of the considerations have been discussed above. Where there is
an issue as to whether the horse is "used or produced in farming
operations," as that phrase is used in section 9-109(3), it may be
difficult to be certain of the place to file. After making this anal-
ysis, a lender's attorney may often find that precautionary filings
are in order.107 Such categorization is especially difficult where
the collateral is a syndicate share. ' 08
III. PRIORITY
A. General
The foregoing consideration of when and where to file also
indicates the location and manner by which pre-existing security
interests in the collateral may be perfected. In some circum-
stances it is possible that perfection by possession and automatic
perfection may occur.' o Because of the ambiguity resulting from
the difficulty in characterizing the collateral and the possibility
there may have been several previous owners, it is often difficult
or impractical to examine all records which could conceivably
evidence a pre-existing lien on the collateral. An exception to the
problem may exist, though, where the horse was purchased by
the debtor at certain public auctions in Kentucky. This possibil-
ity is provided for in KRS section 355.9-307(4), a section added
by the Kentucky legislature. "0 Absent protection being provided
107 The desirability of such precautionary filings is the same as discussed for multi-
state filings discussed in note 95 supra; it is better to file in too many places than to guess at
which is the proper place to file and later find out that an interpretation of the require-
ments of Article 9 was incorrect, leaving a lender's security interest unperfected.
108 For a discussion of the difficulties in categorizing syndicate shares as collateral,
see text accompanying notes 62-74 supra.
1M For a discussion of perfection by possession and automatic perfection as they re-
late to security interests in horses, see text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
11o For a discussion of KBS § 355.9-307(4) (Supp. 1982), see text accompanying
notes 116-26 infra.
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by KRS section 355.9-304(4), a business decision will frequently
need to be made as to the time and number of owners which the
examination should span.
In analyzing the priority issue with respect to progeny, it also
is necessary to consider whether the owner of the mare or the
stallion has a right to the offspring of the animals. The general
rule for most animals is that the offspring of animals belongs to
the owner of the dam or mother and is based upon the fact that
the male is frequently unknown and the fact that the female is
less useful during pregnancy."' These factors may, however,
have little significance in the case of valuable horses involved in
breeding. Of course, the ownership of issue may be contracted
away. 112
An interesting problem is presented when the owner of a
mare enters into a lease or similar agreement prior to the creation
of a security interest. The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Maize v.
Bowman,"' faced a similar situation when the owner of a mare
entered into an agreement to allow Bowman to breed the mare
and retain the foal. The mare was purchased while in foal at a
court sale pursuant to a lien acquired after the date of the agree-
ment. The court held Bowman (rather than the subsequent pur-
chaser) to be entitled to the colt."4 Similarly, the general rule is
that when a mare is hired or leased, other than gratuitously, the
bailee or lessee rather than the owner of the mare is the owner of
increase during the term of the bailment or lease.I'
B. Special Treatment for Horses Sold at Auctions in Kentucky
After the security interest is perfected, a lender should take
all possible steps to make sure its priority is not inadvertently lost
or subordinated. This is done in the same manner as with any
other collateral, with some significant exceptions. The most sig-
nificant exception in Kentucky is provided by KRS section 355.9-
"' See, e.g., Farris & Co. v. Collier, 136 So. 510 (Fla. 1931).
1 1 2 Maize v. Bowman, 19 S.W. 589 (Ky. 1892).
1 Id.
"I Id. at 589.
115 See, e.g., Connolley v. Power, 232 P. 744 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Kellogg v.
Lovely, 8 N.W. 699 (Mich. 1881).
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307(4), under which the bona fide purchaser of a racing horse at
certain public auctions takes free and clear of any lien.116 The or-
ganization holding the auction also is not subject to any liability
to the lienholder unless it has received written notification of the
lien prior to the auction.,"7
This statute may have broad impact because of the number
of important horse sales held in Kentucky. As a matter of protect-
ing its liens, a lender may be compelled to check the catalogs
from these sales. At the least, the creditor would want to provide
the required notice if such a sale were held. As stated above, this
statute also may benefit the creditor by eliminating prior liens or
limiting the period for which records need to be checked. How-
ever, there are problems with respect to the applicability and va-
lidity of this statute.
Perhaps the most difficult problem in dealing with KRS sec-
tion 355.9-307(4) is the choice of law provisions of U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-103. That is, if the law of another state is to be applied to
the continuity of perfection of the prior security interest, the
Kentucky statute may not be given effect to nullify the lien as to a
bona fide purchaser. Thus, a new security interest perfected
after such an auction might not have senior priority. In such a sit-
uation, the party obtaining a security interest following an ap-
propriate auction within Kentucky may argue that section 9-103
was not intended to control the choice of law with respect to a
statute which discharges a security interest. Such an argument
stands a better chance of prevailing if the state whose law is be-
ing applied has the 1972 version of the Code, because the 1962
version of section 9-103 specifically refers to the "validity and
perfection" of a security interest while the 1972 version refers
116 KRS § 355.9-307(4) (Supp. 1982) provides in full:
If any livestock subject to the lien of a security interest is sold at public
auction through a stockyard licensed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky in
the ordinary course of business, a bona fide purchaser for value of such live-
stock shall take title thereto free and clear of any such lien, and the stockyard
and selling agents selling such livestock shall not be liable to the holder of
such lien, unless written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested or
by registered mail, of such lien, the name and address of the debtor and
proper description of the livestock subject to lien is given to the stockyard
prior to the time of sale.
Id.
117 Id.
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solely to "perfection.""" In any event, a lender faced with such a
situation will have to analyze the matter carefully, giving consid-
eration to the location of the parties involved, as well as the ap-
plicable version of the Code, before relying upon KRS section
355.9-307(4).
Other questions are unanswered. For example, it might be
argued that the statute takes property without due process or
that it violates the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Few cases address this specific issue, but the North
Carolina Supreme Court has held that the state legislature had
the power to effect registration requirements without violating
due process." 9 In W.H. Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge,12 food
subject to a chattel mortgage in North Carolina was moved to
Virginia and sold. The secured party sued for the proceeds of the
sale. Besides requiring the registration of in-state security inter-
ests, Virginia law required the registration of security interests
perfected in other states on goods located in Virginia. The trial
court held for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to also
register in Virginia.' 2' On appeal, the plaintiff argued that such a
registration requirement violated due process as an unlawful tak-
ing. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the legislature
could effect registration of security interest requirements without
violating due process. 2
The Kentucky statute has important limitations on its oper-
ation. One such limitation is that the statute only purports to
convey the horse free from "the lien of a security interest"; such a
lien apparently would not include tax liens, agister's liens, judg-
ment liens and other similar liens. '2 Another noteworthy limita-
tion contained in KRS section 355.9-307(4) is that it only aids "a
bona fide purchaser for value of such horse."' Frequently, the
118 See U.C.C. § 9-103. The 1972 version is intended to deal with the perfection of a
security interest but not the validity of such a security interest. U.C.C. § 9-103 Reasons for
1972 Change (1972).
119 W.H. Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 187 S.E. 588 (N.C. 1936).
12o Id.
121 Id. at 589.
12 2 Id.
123 Such a conclusion may be reached by reading U.C.C. §§ 9-104, 9-102(2) and 1-
201(37), which set forth the limited applicability of Article 9 to statutory liens. See aso
WrTE & SuMMERs § 22-2, supra note 21.
'24 See KRS § 355.9-307(4) (Cune. Supp. 1982).
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purchaser of the animal may either be the seller buying back
horses or someone else with knowledge of a lender's existing lien.
In such cases the purchaser should not be a "bona fide pur-
chaser"-one who takes in good faith, for value'25 and without
knowledge of the rights of other parties.125
C. Condition Precedent to Action Against Purchaser or Selling
Agent
Another Kentucky statute not found in the official versions of
the Code also may require special consideration. The statute ap-
plies when a secured party has a lien in livestock, and the live-
stock is sold without discharging the debt to the secured party. 2T
Under KRS section 355.9-319, the secured party is precluded
from bringing an action against the purchaser or selling agent
until he or she has fully pursued remedies against the debtor. m
While this statute is clear and self-explanatory, a creditor should
recognize that some delay can be caused in collection.
D. Agister's Lien and Lien for Service Fees
In determining whether a creditor with a security interest in
a horse has priority among claims to the horse, 12 liens which may
be created in the horse by statute must be considered. In Ken-
tucky, the most relevant liens are those which arise in favor of
one who keeps a livery stable or who feeds or grazes cattle for
compensation, known as an agister's lien, and in favor of a li-
censed keeper of a stallion for service fees.
125 For a bona fide purchaser to "take for value" it is not required that the full fair
market value be paid; however, the price paid must be adequate.
126 See, e.g., Turner v. Risner, 134 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Ky. 1939); Blodgett v.
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978).
127 See KRS 355.9-319 (Supp. 1982). In full, the statute provides:
Before a secured party possessing a lien against livestock or grain that
has been sold without the debt to the secured party being discharged may
bring an action against the purchaser or selling agent of the livestock or
grain, he shall pursue his remedy against his debtor to the point where a
judgment is rendered on the merits or the suit is dismissed with prejudice.
Id.
128 Id.
129 U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-310 and 9-312 govern priority disputes.
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KRS section 376.400 provides for a lien on horses kept in a
livery stable, or which are fed or grazed by another for compen-
sation, in favor of the party caring for the horses. 30 The lien is in
the amount of the party's reasonable charges for keeping, caring
for, feeding and grazing the horses.' 3' A lien under KRS section
376.400 is subject to the same limitations as a landlord's lien.132
The thrust of these limitations is to limit what is covered by the
lien to four months rent. 3 A lien created by KRS section 376.400
can be enforced by the lienholder presenting to the proper dis-
trict court an affidavit setting forth the amount due and the
horses so kept. 34 The court issues a warrant and the sheriff levies
upon and seizes the horses. 1-1
A lien for service fees in favor of a "licensed keeper" of a stal-
lion is created by KRS section 376.420(1).138 The lien covers the
offspring of the stallion kept and exists for one year after the birth
of the progeny. 13' This lien for service fees may be enforced by
court action or by the method described for an agister's lien. 131
130 In full, KRS § 376.400 (1972) provides:
Any owner or keeper of a livery stable, and a person feeding or grazing
cattle for compensation, shall have a lien upon the cattle placed in the stable
or put out to be fed or grazed by the owner, for his reasonable charges for
keeping, caring for, feeding and grazing the cattle. The lien shall attach
whether the cattle are merely temporarily lodged, fed, grazed and cared for,
or are placed at the stable or other place or pasture for regular board. The
lien shall be subject to the limitations and restrictions placed upon a land-
lord's lien for rent.
Id. The term "cattle" as used in the statute is defined as including horses. KRS §
446.010(6) (Supp. 1982).
131 RS § 376.400 (1972).
1321 Id.
133The limitations are found in KRS § 383.070(2), (3) and (4) (1972). A landlord's
lien for up to four months rent is not limited by these sections to periods prior to a security
interest in the delinquent rentor's personal property being created. See KRS § 383.070(3)
(1972).
11 KRS § 376.410 (Supp. 1980).
135id.
130 "Any licensed keeper of a stallion, jack or bull shall have a lien for the payment of
the service fee upon the get of the stallion, jack or bull, for one (1) year after the birth of
the progeny." KRS § 376.420(1) (1972). The "get" in which the lien is created refers to the
offspring of the stallion, not the mare being served. 68 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 112 (1968) (un-
published).
137 KRS § 376.420(1) (1972).
138 KRS § 376.420(2) (1972).
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The fact that the lien under KRS section 376.420(1) is in
favor of a "licensed keeper" poses an interesting question. At one
time Kentucky required a keeper of stallions to maintain a li-
cense.139 In fact, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Smith v. Rob-
ertson14° held there was no lien under this section where the
plaintiff did not have the license required to stand stallions for
hire.14 ' While that requirement no longer appears to be man-
dated by statute, there could be a local ordinance to this effect.'14
Unfortunately, no Kentucky cases have considered this trouble-
some language since the repeal of the special licensing require-
ments. The reasoning of Smith v. Robertson would not apply
when there is no such requirement, and it would seem likely that
a court would ignore the "license" language when applying the
statute.
The Code deals with the priority of perfected security inter-
ests vis-a-vis statutory liens in section 9-310.143 Under section 9-
310, a party having a statutory lien in a horse for furnishing ser-
vices or materials in the ordinary course of business, if in posses-
sion of the horse, will prevail against a party holding a perfected
security interest unless the statute creating the lien provides
otherwise.' Thus, one with an agister's lien under KRS section
376.400, who in all likelihood will be in possession of the horse,
will prevail against a perfected secured party. Likewise, as to
liens created under KRS section 376.420(1), if either the off-
spring or the mare in foal is in the possession of the keeper of the
stallion which provided the services when the suit is filed, it
seems that the requirements of section 9-310 are met and the lien
139 In Smith v. Robertson, 50 S.W. 852 (Ky. 1899), it was stated: "It is not disputed
but what the Kentucky Statutes require license to be paid by all persons who stand stal-
lions for hire .... Id. at 853.
140 Id. at 852.
141 Id. at 855.
142 See Ky. CONST. § 181; KRS § 92.280 (1982).
113 In full, U.C.C. § 9-310 provides:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon
goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such
materials or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless
the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Id.
144 Id.
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of the licensed keeper will take priority over a previously per-
fected security interest.145 This analysis, of course, assumes that
the security interest of the lender has been properly perfected. A
lender must remember that an analysis of liens of this type must
be made on a state by state basis and our analysis is limited to
Kentucky. Other jurisdictions may provide for similar liens by
statute.
In additon to the statutory lien, it may be possible to assert a
common law lien where the provider of services retains posses-
sion of the animals. At common law, a lien for a service fee was
created in favor of a stallion owner who received a mare to be
served by the stallion, and the lien existed for as long as the stal-
lion owner retained possession of the mare. 46 However, courts
have generally held there is no common law lien for board.'17 It
also is possible to argue the existence of an equitable lien'4 or for
recovery in equity' 9 from a person who benefits from the services
or board to the extent the services and care enhance the value of
the animal.
Another practical consideration related to bills for service
fees and board is that the owner of a stallion may refuse to pro-
vide the necessary papers for registration of foals unless the bills
are paid.I' ° While it may be possible to deal with this problem by
litigation, the expense in time and money can be prohibitive. A
lender's attorney should, therefore, consider obtaining waivers of
such claims or checking for unpaid bills prior to closing the loan.
Finally, the significance of the liens created by KRS sections
376.400 and 376.420(1) (or similar statutes in other jurisdictions)
145 Cf. Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1964) (holding a similar
statutory lien prevails even though KRS § 376.450 provides for precedence of a "mort-
gage" and "bona fide sale" in certain instances). See generally Forrest Cate Ford, Inc. v.
Fryar, 465 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. App. 1970); Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 1162 (1976).
146 See Sawyer v. Gerrish, 70 Me. 259 (1879); Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill 485 (N.Y.
1842)i47 See, e.g., Shartzer v. Ulmer, 333 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. 1959); Hanch v. Ripley,
26 N.E. 70, 71 (Ind. 1890); Loader v. Bank of Idana, 216 P. 264, 265 (Kan. 1923).
148 For a thorough discussion of the creation and enforcement of equitable liens, see
L. JONES, A TREATISE ON Tm LAW OF LIENS 23-92 (3d ed. 1914).149 See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDiES 237-38 (1973).
150 The papers necessary for registering the foal with either The Jockey Club or The
United States Trotting Association, are discussed in the text accompanying notes 3-4
supra.
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and the possibility that there will be hurdles to the sale or regis-
tration unless these bills are paid should not be dismissed because
both the board bill and service fee for registered horses are often
very high compared with other animals.
E. Buyers in the Ordinary Course and Authorized Dispositions
Section 9-307(1) of the Code affords special protection to
buyers "in the ordinary course of business," but excludes from
that section persons "buying farm products from a person en-
gaged in farming operations."'," A buyer in the ordinary course
of business is defined as "a person who in good faith and without
knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in or-
dinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind."152 Buyers within section 9-307(1) take free of any se-
curity interest created by the seller even though the security in-
terest may be perfected and even if the buyer knows of the secur-
ity interest's existence. 1 -
In determining whether the private sale of horses will fall
within the purview of section 9-307(1), the focus is on whether
the seller is "a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind." It can be argued that a breeder who periodically upgrades
broodmare stock by a private sale of broodmares is not in the bus-
iness 9f selling goods of that kind (broodmares). It is generally
held that a sale incidental to the seller's principal business does
not make the seller a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind.'5 Thus, under section 9-307(1), the security interest
would arguably be preserved in the broodmares upon the disposi-
151 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201)
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming op-
erations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the se-
curity interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
Id.
152 U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
153 U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
154 See, e.g., O-Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But
see American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing Co., 298 N.E.2d
209 (Il. App. Ct. 1973) (lessor of cars held to be in business of selling cars when evidence
showed it was customary to sell the automobiles after they had been leased).
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tion by private sale. On the other hand, there is a good argument
that the breeder should be treated as being in the business of sell-
ing young horses. In any event, the characterization of the seller's
business is important.
If the seller is characterized as being "in the business of sell-
ing goods of that kind," we must next consider whether the
exception applies. That is, section 9-307 of the Code does not af-
fect a prior security interest if the goods sold are "farm products"
and the seller is engaged in "farming operations." As previously
discussed, goods are characterized according to the definitions
contained in section 9-109 of the Code.'1 Goods are farm pro-
ducts if they are "livestock. . .and if they are in the possession
of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farm-
ing operations."'156 The Code describes inventory as goods "held
by a person who holds them for sale or lease."' 57 Classes of goods
are mutually exclusive,'- and the Code explicitly states that
goods characterized as farm products are not inventory. 59 Thus,
horses held in breeding operations will frequently be farm pro-
ducts, and section 9-307 will not protect buyers of those horses.
A related section is KRS section 35.9-306(2), which ter-
minates a security interest upon the sale, exchange or other dis-
position of collateral by the debtor if the debtor's action "was
authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise."' Of course, most loan agreements will by their
terms explicitly allow certain dispositions. However, the real
problems are caused by the dispositions which are "otherwise"
authorized. For example, there is a sound argument that allow-
ing one to race in a claiming race is authority to sell free of the se-
curity interest.' 6' Unfortunately, the limitations on the "other-
wise" authorization are unclear.
155 For a discussion of the characterization of goods, see text accompanying notes
101-08 supra.
15, U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
157 U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
158 See U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 2.
159 See U.C.C. § 9-109(3).
16( KRS § 355.9-306(2). The Kentucky provision is identical to the 1962 version of
the Code. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The 1972 version of the Code made minor changes to
clarify the provision. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972).
161 The peculiar nature of a claiming race is discussed in note 1 supra. Allowing a
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Another substantial risk to a secured party may exist when
there has been a practice or custom of allowing a particular
debtor to sell a certain type of collateral. In Cessna Finance
Corp. v. Skyways Enter. ,162 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held
that a restriction in a mortgage on an airplane, providing that
the debtor (a dealer in airplanes) could not sell the airplane with-
out the prior consent of the mortgagee, was waived by the con-
duct of the secured party. The secured party had acquiesced in
the debtor's sale of other airplanes subject to similar restrictions
without its prior consent. 16 Cessna may have serious implications
where a secured party has allowed sales on a regular basis. Sev-
eral jurisdictions do not follow the Cessna rationale and have
held that there is no implied waiver by course of conduct.' 64
These decisions are based on section 1-205(4) which states that
"[t]he express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing.., shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable ex-
press terms control ... course of dealing ... ,,l These deci-
sions are supported by U.C.C. section 9-105(4) which provides
that Article 1 contains "principles of construction and interpreta-
tion applicable throughout this Article."le However, some courts
obviously are not persuaded by this reasoning. 11
In reviewing the provisions of sections 9-307(1) and 9-306(2),
a lender must be aware of the "two-pronged" nature of each. For
example, section 9-306 may make a secured party's lien superior
to the lien of an earlier lender but inferior to a subsequent lender.
horse in which there is an existing security interest to be entered in a claiming race, it can
be argued, is authorizingthe transfer of the horse's title.
162 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1015, 1018-19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), affd on other grounds,
580 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1979).
163 See also Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 425 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1967). Cf. Central
Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 521 P.2d 226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding a
material issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had directly or impliedly waived the consent
requirement).
164 See, e.g., Environmental Electronic Systems, Inc. v. Nikko Audio, 2 Bankr. 583
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); Wabasco State Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 251 N.W.2d 321
(Minn. 1976); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 212 N.W.2d 625
(Neb. 1973); Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 N.W.2d 99 (Neb. 1971).
165 U.C.C. S 1-205(4).
166 U.C.C. § 9-105(5).
167 For a discussion of these cases, see notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
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In reviewing these provisions, it is helpful to note that the under-
lying purpose of Article 9 of the Code is "to protect a security in-
terest so long as it does not interfere with the normal flow of com-
merce.""' For this reason, secured parties can lose their security
interests by authorizing the disposition of the collateral under
section 9-306(2) or if the collateral is sold to a buyer in ordinary
course of business (except farm products sold by one engaged in
farming operations).
IV. DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
A lender should give some special considerations to the en-
forcement of a lien. These issues primarily involve the disposition
of the collateral. First, if the collateral is an unregistered secur-
ity, a secured party will have all of the usual problems in dispos-
ing of collateral in such a situation. IM
Another problem is that a purchaser is unlikely to make any
substantial payment for a thoroughbred or standardbred horse
unless The Jockey Club or The United States Trotting Association
certificates are properly endorsed over or a new certificate is ob-
tained.'70 One possible way of dealing with this problem may be
by obtaining a power of attorney in the security agreement.
Another may be to have a new certificate issued. The appropri-
ate association may be willing to do so if an attorney provides it
with an opinion regarding the effectiveness of the transfer of
ownership and if other documents which the association may re-
quest are provided. In any case, though, it is important to have
the cooperation of The Jockey Club and The United States Trot-
ting Association. In fact, it is certainly arguable that a sale is not
commercially reasonable as required by section 9-504(3) of the
Code unless accomplished in a manner that contemplates the
purchaser obtaining the appropriate certificate. 17
168 McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 273 A.2d 198,209 (Md.
1971).1) See Comment, The Guild Films Case: The Effect of "Good Faith"in Foreclosure
Sales of Unregistered Securities Pledged as Collateral, 46 'VA. L. RBv. 1573 (1960).
170 These organizations are discussed in notes 3 and 4 supra.
171 Few specific requirements govern the conduct of a sale of collateral by a secured
party after default, but "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
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V. SYNDICATE SHARES AS SECURITIES
The securities laws unexpectedly apply to loans to purchase
syndicate shares. While the simple sale and delivery of animals
does not constitute the sale of a security, the courts will consider
substance over form and the sale of a horse could be structured in
such a way as to constitute a security. 72 However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission in recent No-Action Letters has de-
termined that at least certain syndicate shares will not be treated
as securities.173
Once a determination is made that a syndicate share is a se-
curity, a number of potential problems arise such as a lender be-
ing an aider and abettor of the perpetuation of fraud in connec-
tion with the sale or purchase of a security or the improper sale or
purchase of an unregistered security.174 Further, if the syndicate
share is a security, there may be problems with the disposition of
the collateral.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion is intended to present some of the
unusual analyses the attorney for a lender should undertake in
connection with the creation of a security interest in thorough-
bred and standardbred horses. Perhaps the most significant chal-
lenge is the difficulty in characterizing interests in horses as col-
lateral. As discussed, these characterization problems arise in
nearly every significant part of the analysis.
172 CJ. Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (sale of investment contracts for sale and care of bearers was
held to be a sale of securities).
173 See, e.g., John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18, 1977).
174 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Ruder, Multiple De-
fendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delic-
to, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
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